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Supporting	global	governance:		
A	rules-based	approach	for	a	post-
liberal	order?	
	
Hylke	Dijkstra	
Director	of	the	MA	in	European	Studies,	Maastricht	University,	the	Netherlands	
	
Abstract	
	
From	 “effective	 multilateralism”	 in	 the	 European	 Security	 Strategy	 to	 a	 “rules-
based	international	order”	in	the	Global	Strategy,	the	EU	has	been	at	the	forefront	
of	 supporting	 global	 governance.	 Yet	 global	 governance	 is	 increasingly	 under	
pressure	and	pundits	are	now	regularly	 talking	about	the	post-liberal	order.	How	
does	 the	 EU	 implement	 the	 Global	 Strategy	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 a	 rules-based	
international	order	against	the	background	of	Trump's	"America	First",	 the	BRICS	
challenging	 the	 status	 quo,	 and	 Brexit	 undermining	 the	 Union's	 international	
standing?	Unfortunately	the	EU	is	currently	too	much	a	bystander	as	the	edifice	of	
global	governance	is	coming	down.	
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Even	within	 the	Brussels	bubble,	 the	emergence	of	a	 "post-liberal	order"	 is	 increasingly	 the	 talk	of	
the	 town.1	For	 the	EU,	 the	 importance	of	 this	development	cannot	be	overstated.	After	all,	 the	EU	
itself	is	a	product	of	the	embedded	liberalism	of	the	post-1945	world	order	that	has	developed	under	
American	hegemony	over	the	last	seven	decades.	Indeed,	much	of	EU	foreign	and	security	policy	has	
been	about	projecting	internal	EU	standards	(rule	of	law,	good	governance,	human	rights)	to	the	rest	
of	the	world.	The	European	Security	Strategy	talked	about	"effective	multilateralism".	The	EU	Global	
Strategy	emphasizes	support	for	a	"rules-based	international	order"	as	a	key	priority.	
	
The	 challenge	 of	 the	 post-liberal	 order	 therefore	 puts	 constraints	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 EU	 to	
implement	the	Global	Strategy.	In	addition,	it	also	puts	the	EU	itself	on	the	defensive.	The	latter	is	a	
new	development.	Much	of	 the	post–Cold	War	period	was	 about	projecting	 EU	 standards	 abroad,	
not	about	defending	 the	status	quo.	Occasionally,	 the	EU	was	described	as	a	"post-modern	actor",	
which	meant	that	the	EU	would	also	need	to	develop	security	capabilities	to	deal	with	the	rest	of	the	
world	 ("In	 the	 jungle,	 one	must	 use	 the	 laws	 of	 the	 jungle").2	Yet	 this	 also	was	 about	 exerting	 EU	
influence	over	the	rest	of	the	world.		
	
This	article	argues	 that	 for	 reasons	of	 self-preservation,	 it	 is	 critically	 important	 that	 the	EU	makes	
immediately	work	 of	 the	 ambitions	 of	 the	Global	 Strategy.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 the	 EU	 staying	
strong	where	the	rest	of	the	structure	of	global	governance	is	coming	down.	While	this	objective	is	
acknowledged	 in	 the	 Global	 Strategy	with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 support	 for	 a	 rules-based	 international	
order,	we	 can	 only	 conclude	 that	 the	 implementation	 has	 so	 far	 been	weak.	 The	 EU	 is	more	 of	 a	
bystander	 as	 the	 edifice	 of	 global	 governance	 comes	 down.	 Furthermore,	 the	 new	 EU	 leadership,	
taking	office	 in	 the	autumn,	 should	 reconsider	whether	 the	Global	 Strategy	 is,	 in	 fact,	 sufficient	 in	
terms	of	support	for	the	rules-based	global	order.			
	
When	life	is	“solitary,	poor,	nasty,	brutish,	and	short”	
	
While	 discussions	 on	 the	 end	 of	 the	 American	 world	 order	 go	 some	 while	 back,3	the	 election	 of	
Donald	Trump	as	US	President	in	November	2016	sparked	immediately	a	debate	on	the	post-liberal	
order.	Foreign	Affairs	 dedicated	 the	 cover,	 and	 a	 substantial	 section,	 of	 its	 January/February	 2017	
issue	 to	 the	 topic	 "Out	of	Order?	 The	 Future	of	 the	 International	 System".4	This,	 in	 turn,	 triggered	
                                                
1See,	 e.g.,	 Anthony	 Dworkin	 and	 Mark	 Leonard,	 “Can	 Europe	 Save	 the	 World	 Order?”,	 24	 May	 2018,	
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/can_europe_save_the_world_order;	 Sven	 Biscop,	 ”1919-2019:	
How	 to	Make	Peace	Last?	European	Strategy	and	 the	Future	of	 the	World	Order”,	 in	Egmont	Security	Policy	
Briefs,	No.	106	(2019),	http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/01/SPB102.pdf			
2Robert	 Cooper,	Breaking	 of	 Nations:	 Order	 and	 Chaos	 in	 the	 Twenty-first	 Century,	 New	 York:	 Grove	 Press,	
2004,	p.	62.	
3Fareed	 Zakaria,	 The	 Post-American	World:	 And	 the	 Rise	 of	 the	 Rest,	 London,	 Penguin	 Press,	 2008;	 Amitav	
Acharya,	The	End	of	American	World	Order,	Cambridge,	Polity	Press,	2014;	G.	John	Ikenberry,	Liberal	Leviathan:	
The	 Origins,	 Crisis,	 and	 Transformation	 of	 the	 American	World	 Order,	 Princeton,	 Princeton	 University	 Press,	
2012.		
4Foreign	 Affairs,	 “Out	 of	 Order?	 The	 Future	 of	 the	 International	 System”,	 Vol.	 96,	 No.	 1	 (January/February	
2017). 
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considerable	 further	 debate.	 While	 some	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 "liberal	 international	 order"	 is	
neither	 liberal,	 nor	 international,	 nor	 orderly,5	others	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 liberal	 international	
order	runs	deeper	than	US	hegemony.6		
	
While	the	precise	depth	of	the	crisis	of	the	liberal	international	order	remains	to	be	seen,7	it	is	clear	
that	 the	 system	 of	 global	 governance	 is	 under	 considerable	 pressure.	 All	 sorts	 of	 international	
organizations,	 global	 governance	 arrangements	 and	 international	 agreements,	 which	 the	 EU	
cherishes	or	at	 the	very	 least	participates	 in	and	abides	by,	are	currently	under	 threat.	The	Trump	
administration	 has	 notably	 announced	 that	 it	 will	 withdraw	 from	 the	 Paris	 agreement	 on	 climate	
change.	It	has	re-imposed	sanctions	on	Iran,	and	the	United	States	quit	UNESCO	in	2018.	If	the	Trump	
administration	has	not	yet	been	busy	enough,	it	has	picked	a	trade	war	with	China,	and	sidelined	the	
WTO.	Meanwhile	Donald	Trump	himself	is	said	to	have	considered	exiting	NATO.8		
	
At	least	as	harmful	as	the	direct	challenge	of	the	United	States	to	the	system	of	global	governance	is	
the	example	 that	 it	 sets	 for	other	countries.	Burundi	quit	 the	 International	Criminal	Court	 in	2017,	
the	Philippines	will	 leave	 in	March	2019,	 and	South	Africa	nearly	 left	 as	well.	 Japan	 is	quitting	 the	
International	 Whaling	 Commission	 and	 will	 start	 commercial	 hunting	 again	 in	 July	 2019.	 The	 list	
continues	 and	 this	 is	 powerful	 evidence	 of	 what	 the	 unraveling	 of	 international	 order	 looks	 like.	
While	all	 these	developments	cannot	be	blamed	on	the	White	House,	 it	 is	also	clear	that	there	are	
currently	no	hegemonic	pressures	to	prevent	them.	
	
The	 Trump	 administration	 understandably	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 blame,	 but	 the	 challenge	 to	 the	
international	 liberal	 order	 and	 particularly	 the	 status	 quo	 cherished	 by	 the	 EU	 is	 broader.	 The	
emerging	 powers,	 particularly	 Brazil,	 Russia,	 India,	 China	 and	 South	 Africa	 (BRICS),	 had	 already	 in	
2013	presented	the	 international	community	with	a	whole	wish	 list	 for	global	governance	reform.9	
While	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 BRICS	 have	 gone	 relatively	 quiet	 –	 despite	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 New	
Development	 Bank,	 the	Asian	 Infrastructure	 Investment	 Bank,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Belt	 and	
Road	 Initiative	 –	 the	 fundamental	 challenge	 to	 how	 the	 EU	 prefers	 the	world	 has	 not	 gone	 away.	
Similar	things	can	be	said	about	the	situation	in	the	South	China	Sea	or	the	Korean	Peninsula.	With	
the	 recent	 election	 of	 Jair	 Bolsonaro,	 the	 EU	may	 furthermore	 have	 lost	 an	 ally	 in	 Brazil	 when	 it	
comes	to	global	governance.		
	
	
	
	
                                                
5Niall	Ferguson	in	Niall	Ferguson	and	Fareed	Zakaria,	Is	This	the	End	of	the	Liberal	International	Order?:	The	
Munk	Debates,	Toronto,	House	of	Anansi	Press,	2017.	
6John	Ikenberry,	“The	End	of	Liberal	International	Order?”,	in	International	Affairs,	Vol.	94,	No.	1	(2018),	p.	7-
23.	
7Ibid.		
8Julian	E.	Barnes	and	Helene	Cooper,	“Trump	Discussed	Pulling	U.S.	From	NATO,	Aides	Say	Amid	New	Concerns	
Over	Russia”,	in	New	York	Times,	14	January	2019,	https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-
president-trump.html	
9BRICS,	“BRICS	and	Africa:	Partnership	for	Development,	Integration	and	Industrialisation”,	in	eThekwini	
Declaration,	Durban,	South	Africa,	27	March	2013,	http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html 
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The	EU	has	little	to	show	for		
	
While	all	these	developments	make	it	obviously	very	challenging	for	the	EU	to	implement	its	Global	
Strategy	with	regard	to	multilateralism,	they	also	show	the	need	for	real	progress.	So	how	is	the	EU	
faring?	The	answer	 is	 rather	sobering.	Rather	 than	propping	up	support	 for	global	governance,	 the	
EU	is	largely	a	bystander	as	the	edifice	is	coming	down.	
	
The	EU's	own	year	2	implementation	report	makes	rather	unimpressive	reading.10	It	has	very	little	of	
relevance	 to	 report	 on	 rules-based	 international	 order.	 It	 is	 largely	 about	 "meetings"	 which	 took	
place	on	marginal	topics	and	"Good	Human	Rights	Stories";	the	implementation	report	even	dares	to	
mention	the	Paris	Agreement	and	the	International	Criminal	Court	as	a	success.	One	area	where	the	
EU	has,	admittedly,	actively	opposed	the	Washington	line	concerns	the	Joint	Comprehensive	Plan	of	
Action	(JCPOA)	with	Iran.	While	the	United	States	under	Trump	has	reinstalled	sanctions,	the	EU	has	
stuck	with	the	agreement	and	Iran	so	far	is	also	fulfilling	its	promises.	That	having	been	said,	the	Iran	
deal	falls	short	of	a	"success	story".	
	
First,	 the	unilateral	 sanctions	 imposed	by	 the	United	States	on	 Iran	have	extraterritorial	effect	and	
thus	 also	 affect	 European	 companies	 trading	with	 Iran.	 For	 instance,	 they	 have	 resulted	 in	 Airbus	
having	to	cancel	its	contracts.11	Furthermore,	as	a	result	of	US	pressure,	the	Iranian	currency	has	all	
but	collapsed	in	2018	putting	considerable	pressure	on	the	Iranian	middle	class.	Second,	the	EU	had	
to	 (belatedly)	 adopt	 targeted	 sanctions	 as	 well	 on	 Iran	 as	 a	 result	 of	 government-sponsored	
assassinations	 in	 Denmark,	 France	 and	 the	 Netherlands.12	This	 shows	 how	 fragile	 the	 Iran	 deal	 –	
lauded	as	the	most	important	achievement	of	the	EU	in	years	–	actually	is.	In	the	most	recent	Council	
conclusions,	 the	EU	complained	about	 Iran's	behaviour,	 from	Syria	 to	Yemen,	ballistic	missiles	 and	
human	 rights.	 It	 notes	 that	 "existing	 tensions	 and	 distrust	 in	 the	 region	 should	 not	 be	 further	
exacerbated".13	
	
Noteworthy	 is	 furthermore	 the	 increased	emphasis	 in	2018	on	EU	support	 for	 the	United	Nations,	
and	 particularly	 for	 the	 reform	 effort	 led	 by	 Secretary	 General	 António	 Guterres.	 This	 included	
among	other	 things	 a	 visit	 to	Brussels.	 Furthermore,	 the	EU	has	provided	 strong	 support	 for	 a	UN	
headquarters	reform,	which	materialized	in	January	2019.	While	the	UN	reform	was	sorely	needed,	
the	 reforms	 are	 ultimately	 about	management	 and	 delivery	 rather	 than	 a	 new	 agenda	 for	 global	
governance.		
	
                                                
10EEAS,	Implementing	the	EU	Global	Strategy	Year	2,	June	2018,	
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf	
11Reuters,	“Iran	Urges	EU	to	Press	Washington	on	Airbus	Deliveries:	ISNA”,	17	December	2018,	
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-airbus/iran-urges-eu-to-press-washington-on-airbus-deliveries-isna-
idUSKBN1OG19X	
12Georgi	Gotev,	“Under	Dutch	and	Danish	Pressure,	EU	Hits	Iran	with	Sanctions	After	Murder	Plots”,	in	Euractiv,	
9	January	2019,	https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/under-dutch-and-danish-
pressure-eu-hits-iran-with-sanctions-after-murder-plots/	
13Council,	“Iran:	Council	Adopts	Conclusions”,	Press	Release	65/19,	4	February	2019,	
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/04/iran-council-adopts-conclusions/ 
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One	of	Europe's	key	achievements	of	the	last	years	is	the	negotiation	and	re-negotiation	of	a	series	
of	important	bilateral	trade	agreements	(which	formally	fall	under	cooperative	regional	orders	rather	
than	rules-based	 international	order).14	To	a	certain	degree	this	 is	 really	against	 the	odds.	After	all,	
trade	 agreements	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 international	 liberal	 order.	 And	 indeed,	 the	 EU	 has	
continued	with	these	agreements	against	popular	objections	over	CETA	and	TTIP.	At	the	same	time,	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 emphasis	 is	 now	 fully	 on	 bilateral	 agreements	 rather	 than	 multilateral	 ones	
highlights	the	challenges	ahead	for	a	truly	international	order	based	on	the	rule	of	law.	
	
Conclusion	
	
2019	 is	a	critical	year	for	the	EU.	With	the	elections	of	the	European	Parliament	 in	May	and	a	new	
college	of	Commissioners	taking	office	in	the	fall,	it	is	decision	time.	In	the	various	European	electoral	
programmes,	it	is	often	stated	that	the	EU	needs	to	collectively	stand	up	against	those	forces	wishing	
to	subvert	the	global	order,	whether	in	the	United	States,	Russia	or	elsewhere.	This	is	quite	right	and	
underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Global	 Strategy	 and	 its	 implementation.	 At	 the	 same	 it	 is	 a	 tall	
order.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 the	Global	 Strategy	 itself	 is	 actually	 sufficient	when	 it	 comes	 to	 EU	
support	 for	global	governance.	With	the	elections	coming	up,	 it	 is	 important	 for	the	candidates	for	
the	Commission	Presidency,	and	other	EU	top	jobs,	to	commit	to	the	rule-based	international	liberal	
order.	They	will	have	to	do	more,	however,	than	complain	about	Trump	or	Putin.	They	should	make	
clear	how	they	will	proactively	support	multilateralism	during	the	next	five	years.		
 
                                                
14EEAS,	Implementing	the	EU	Global	Strategy	Year	2,	June	2018,	
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf	
